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UNITED STATES HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY:
EFFECT ON EXPORTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning with his first statements on foreign affairs,1 and con-
tinuing with his public addresses during the first years of his ad-
ministration,2 President Jimmy Carter has sought to identify
United States foreign policy with his campaign for human rights.'
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, in a speech on human rights and
United States foreign policy, said that it is the resolve of the
Carter Administration to make the advancement of human rights
"a central part of our foreign policy."' At the Commemoration of
the 30th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, Carter made what is perhaps his strongest statement on
the subject:
As long as I am President, the Government of the United States
will continue throughout the world to enhance human rights. No
force on earth can separate us from that commitment.
I have sought to rekindle the beacon of human rights in
American foreign policy. Over the last two years we have tried
to express these human concerns as our diplomats practice their
craft and as our Nation fulfills its international obligations.
Human rights are not peripheral to the foreign policy of the
United States. Our human rights policy is not a decoration. It is
not something we have adopted to polish up our image abroad or
For a list of President Carter's human rights statements, see Weissbrodt, Human
Rights Legislation and United States Foreign Policy, 7 GA. J. INTL & COMP. L. 231 n. 2
(1977).
'Id. at 232 n. 3.
There are two strands to the theme of human rights, corresponding generally to the
principles of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, U.S. GAOR Supp. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976, on the one hand, and the International Convention on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, id., on the other hand. Most of the discussion of human rights by
the government and the media has focussed on the former set of human rights. This reflects
perhaps our Western democratic bias that while some nations cannot yet afford food,
clothing, shelter, health care, education, jobs and the like for all its citizens, no country is so
poor that it cannot provide for political and civil rights. For an area of U.S. human rights
policy where economic human rights are considered see II, B., 3 and II, A., 2 of this Note,
infra.
' Law Day Address by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance at the University of Georgia
School of Law (Apr. 30, 1977), reprinted in 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 223 (1977).
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to put a fresh coat of moral paint on the discredited policies of
the past.
* **
Our pursuit of human rights is part of a broad effort to use our
great power and our tremendous influence in the service of
creating a better world....'
Attention to the human rights issue extends beyond executive
branch policy statements. Since 1974, there has been an increase
in congressional interest and legislation as well as the develop-
ment within the State Department of a government agency to
carry out human rights policy.
Despite the sincere intentions of those committed to the ad-
vancement of human rights, controversy has arisen over the
implementation of policy. Private industry has opposed the en-
forcement of human rights policy when such policy has acted as an
impediment to U.S. trade and exports.6 This conflict has been
reflected in inter-governmental debates over the sometimes con-
flicting objectives of human rights policy and national export
policy. Viewed in a broad sense, this conflict is obvious. When
President Carter unveiled his national export policy (to which the
acronyms "NEXPO" and "NEP" have been attached), he em-
phasized the importance to the nation's economic strength that
"both the private sector and the Federal government place a
higher priority on exports."' He voiced the need to reduce
government-imposed barriers which unnecessarily inhibit
American firms from selling abroad.! Speaking specifically of ex-
port controls used for foreign policy purposes, Carter urged cau-
tion:
I am directing the Department of Commerce, State, Defense,
and Agriculture to take export consequences fully into account
when considering the use of export controls for foreign policy
J. Carter, The White House Commemoration of the 30th Anniversary of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 6, 1978. Carter also announced the goals and ac-
complishments of his human rights policy in both his 1978 and 1979 State of the Union Ad-
dress.
' See, e.g., Export Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Finance of
the Senate Comm. on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs, Part 4 - Export-Import Bank
Authorization and Related Issues, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 297, 303 (1978) (statement of the
Machinery and Allied Products Institute).
' President Carter, Statement on National Export Policy, (September 26, 1978) reprinted
in 225 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) (U.S. Export Weekly) AA-1 (Sept. 26, 1978) [hereinafter
cited as Export Policy Statement].
I Id. at AA-3.
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purposes. Weight will be given to whether the goods in question
are also available from countries other than the United States.'
In the first major section of this Note, human rights policy and
statutory provisions will be examined. Next, the implementation
of these policies and laws, as they affect United States exports,
will be discussed. The final section contains information on the af-
fect of these provisions on trade, and recommendations for
methods of advancing both policies - human rights and export
promotion -while minimizing conflicts.
II. POLICY GOALS AND LEGISLATION
In 1973, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Interna-
tional Organizations opened hearings on human rights conditions
in 18 countries. 10 As one American human rights expert has
pointed out, "these hearings chaired by Representative Donald
Fraser of Minnesota and the resulting Subcommittee reports have
heralded a new era in United States foreign policy in regard to
human rights."'1 The hearings were inspired by what Congress
believed was an unwillingness on the part of the State Depart-
ment to seriously consider human rights issues in its dealings
with foreign countries." The Subcommittee concluded that the
United States had not been giving adequate consideration to
human rights violations in formulating its foreign policy, and
made 29 recommendations to improve the situation." These
recommendations led to the initial adoption of human rights provi-
sions in foreign policy legislation in 1973. Subsequently, the early
legislation has been amended and, with the encouragement of the
Carter Administration, generally expanded in scope and force.
'Id.
'o REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENT OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: A CALL FOR
U.S. LEADERSHIP, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as FRASER SUBCOMMITTEE
REPORT].
H Weissbrodt, supra note 1, at 239.
" For a concise discussion of the historical basis for the current United States concern
for global human rights and the erosion of its concern prior to 1973, see Weissbrodt, supra
note 1, at 232-40. The author suggests that traditionally the United States has supported
the right of self government and the right to freedom of religion. During the Cold War
years, government protests against human rights violations became more selective, being
directed generally against communist powers which overthrew non-communist govern-
ments. When Cold War policy was abandoned by the Nixon Administration in favor of a
policy of detente, Secretary of State Kissinger reduced the level of criticism for human
rights violations even in communist countries.
11 FRASER SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, aupta note 10.
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Present human rights sanctions which relate to foreign policy
can be categorized as those which relate to appropriations, those
which affect trade financing, those concerned with the licensing of
export transactions, and those directed specifically towards cer-
tain notorious human rights violators. Human rights provisions
tied to appropriations bills have affected the implementation of
foreign security assistance acts 4 and foreign economic aid acts. "
Financing is affected by human rights provisions added to the
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945,6 the Jackson-Vanik Amendment
to the Trade Acts of 1974,17 statutes regulating the activity of
United States representatives at International Financial Institu-
tions (IFIs),"8 and laws regulating the Overseas Private Invest-
ment Corporation (OPIC).19 Human rights considerations enter the
realm of export licensing through general foreign policy provi-
sions in the Export Administration Act of 1969, as amended
(EAA) licensing provisions in security assistance acts2 and
amendments to and regulations under the EAA which prohibit the
licensing of specific goods to specific nations.' Other restrictions
imposed on nations whose governments flagrantly disregard
human rights norms are a hodgepodge."3 In order to evaluate the
" 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1976) (as amended by Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-384, §§ 6 (a) - (d) (1),
10(b)(1), 12(b), 92 Stat. 731, 732, 735, 737).
11 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(a) (1979 Supp.) (as amended by International Development and Food
Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-161, Title III, § 310, 89 Stat. 860.34); 7 U.S.C. § 1712 (1979
Supp.) (as amended by International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977, Pub. L.
95-88, § 203, 91 Stat. 533).
" 12 U.S.C. § 635(b) (1) (B) (1976) (as amended by Financial Regulatory and Interest Rate
Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-630, Title XIX, 92 Stat. 3641).
19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1979 Supp.).
" 22 U.S.C. § 262(c), (g) (1979 Supp.) (as amended by International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development Act of Oct. 3, 1977, Pub. L. 95-118, Title VII, § 101, 91 Stat. 1067); 22
U.S.C. § 262(d) (1979 Supp.) (as amended by Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Ap-
propriations Act of 1979, Pub. L. 95-481, Title VI, § 611, 91 Stat. 1069).
"' 22 U.S.C. §§ 2199, 2200(a) (1979 Supp.) (as amended by Overseas Private Investment
Corporations Acts of 1978, Pub. L. 95-268, §§ 7(1), (10), 92 Stat. 213).
U 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-13 (1979 Supp.) (amended 1977).
22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1976).
See note 20, supra.
12 U.S.C. § 635e(B) (1978) (ceiling on financing for exports to U.S.S.R.); Foreign
Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1977, Pub. L. 94-441, Title V,
§ 505, 90 Stat. 1465 (1976) (prohibition of military funds for Uruguay); The International
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-329, § 406, 90 Stat.
729 (1976) (limitations on economic assistance, military assistance, sales, and sales credits
for Chile); Bretton Woods Financing Act - Financing Facility, Pub. L. 95-435, § 5(c), (e), 92
Stat. 1051 (1978) (to be codified as 22 U.S.C. § 2151 note) (prohibition of Ugandan imports);
22 U.S.C. 2372 (1979 Supp.) (prohibition against assistance and sales to Argentina); Financial
Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-630, § 1915, 92
Stat. 3641 (1978) (to be codified as 12 U.S.C. § 635(b) (8)) (prohibition on extensions of credit
to South Africa).
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impact that enforcement of this complicated body of legislation
has had on United States exports, it is necessary to begin with a
review of the human rights provisions.
A. Appropriations
The most detailed and perhaps most far-reaching human rights
provision is found in § 502(B) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, as amended (FAA of 1961)." § 502(B)(a)(1) places the human
rights issue squarely in the realm of foreign policy making:
The United States shall . . .promote and encourage increased
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout
the world .... Accordingly, a principal goal of the foreign policy
of the United States shall be to promote the increased obser-
vance of internationally recognized human rights by all coun-
tries.
It is important to note that this is a broad mandate which is not
limited to the "security" assistance mentioned in other subsec-
tions of 502(B).
U 88 Stat. 1795 (1974), as amended by 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (Pamphl. Supp. III, Pt. 1, 1976).
Initially Congress passed § 32 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, a broad provision
which stated that "it is the sense of Congress that the President should deny any economic
or military assistance to the government of any foreign country which practices the intern-
ment or imprisonment of that country's citizens for political purposes," 89 Stat. 714 (1973).
Weissbrodt suggests that Congress could find no evidence that § 32 changed the State
Department's policies in regard to a single country, or that information provided by
diplomats in countries receiving aid was ever used by the Department of State in its policy
deliberations. See generally Weissbrodt, supra note 1, at 241.
In the following year, § 46 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, providing for a new sec-
tion 502(B), was enacted. In 1975 and 1976, Congress passed progressively stronger provi-
sions: 2 U.S.C. § 2151 n(b) (Pamph. Supp. I, 1976) and 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (Pamph. Supp. III, Pt.
1, 1976). Finally, in 1978 the International Securities Assistance Act of 1978 was enacted.
This bill amended Section 502(B) yet again. The section provides in part:
(a)(1) The United States shall, in accordance with its international obligations as
set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in keeping with the constitu-
tional heritage and traditions of the United States, promote and encourage in-
creased respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. Accordingly, a principal goal of
the foreign policy of the United States shall be to promote the increased obser-
vance of internationally recognized human rights by all countries.
(2) Except under circumstances specified in this section, no security assistance
may be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.
(3) In futherance of paragraphs (1) and (2), the President is directed to formulate
and.conduct international security assistance programs of the United States in a
manner which will promote and advance human rights and avoid identification of
the United States through such programs with governments which deny to their
people internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, in
violation of international law or in contravention of the policy of the United
States as expressed in this section or otherwise.
1979]
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1. Security Assistance
Section 502(B)(a)(2) declares that it is the policy of the United
States that:
except under circumstances specified in this section, no security
assistance may be provided to any country the government of
which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of in-
ternationally recognized human rights.
Section 502(B)(d)(1) defines "gross violations" as including "tor-
ture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,
prolonged detention without charges and trial, and other flagrant
denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of person."' A
working definition of "consistent pattern" of "gross violations"
which can be mechanically enforced, has not yet been formulated.
(See discussion in Section III, infra.) Section 502(B)(a)(2) is speci-
fically limited to "security assistance" which includes military
assistance, sales of defense articles, extensions of credits, military
education and training, and licensing for the export of defense-
related goods and services."
In section 502(B)(3):
the President is directed to formulate and conduct interna-
tional security assistance programs of the United States in a
manner which will promote and advance human rights and avoid
identification of the United States through such programs with
governments which deny to their people internationally
recognized human rights ....
The human rights standard in subsection (3) is less specific than in
subsection (2). In addition, the extent of the denial of "interna-
tionally recognized human rights" which will force the President
to effect an assistance program change is left unclear. Never-
theless the first three subsections of 502(B) provide a strong man-
date to include human rights considerations in the formulation of
foreign policy.
Two important reporting requirements are included in 502(B).
An annual report on the human rights records of recipient coun-
tries (which takes into account the findings of appropriate interna-
tional organizations such as the International Committee of the
Red Cross) must be organized by the Coordinator for Human
22 U.S.C. § 2304 (d) (1) (1979 Supp.).
22 U.S.C. § 2304 (d) (2) (A) (1979 Supp.).
22 U.S.C. § 2304 (a) (3) (1979 Supp.).
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Rights and Humanitarian Affairs' and submitted by the Secretary
of State to Congress." A separate report must be submitted on any
country within 30 days of request by either the House or Senate.,*
If the Secretary of State fails to comply within this period of time,
Congress may cut off aid to the country until the report is
delivered. The report must include:
(A) All the available information about observance of and
respect for human rights and fundamental freedom in the coun-
try, and a detailed description of practices by the recipient
government with respect thereto;
(B) the steps the United States has taken to-
(i) promote respect for an observance of human rights in that
country and discourage any practices which are inimical to inter-
nationally recognized human rights, and
(ii) publicly or privately call attention to and disassociate the
United States and any security assistance provided for such
country from, such practices.81
The final subsection requires the Secretary of State to state
whether in his opinion extraordinary circumstances exist which
necessitate a continuation of security assistance, despite human
rights violations.
The last human rights provision relating to security assistance
is found in Section 113 of the Foreign Assistance and Related Pro-
grams Appropriations Act of 1979,1 a bill which provided funds
for the FAA of 1961 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1979.
Section 113 reads as follows:
Funds appropriated by this Act may not be obligated or ex-
pended to private assistance to any country for the purpose of
aiding the efforts of the government of such country to repress
Section 301(a) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act
of 1976, 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1979 Supp.), amended section 624 of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 to provide for the establishment of the Coordinator for Human Rights and Human-
itarian Affairs. Section 109 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1978, Id.
§ 2384, further amended this to upgrade the status of the Coordinator to Assistant
Secretary of State. This change in status reflected the growth in size and influence within
the State Department of the human rights group (headed at this time by Patricia Derian).
For a review of the bureau's responsibilities see Note, Role of Non-Governmental Organiza,
tions in Implementing Human Rights in Latin America 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 477, 501
(1977).
n 22 U.S.C. § 2304(b) (1979 Supp.).
22 U.S.C. § 2304(c) (1) (1979 Supp.).
" Id. § 2304(c) (1) (A), (B).
' Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1979, Pub. L. 95-481,
§ 113, 92 Stat. 1591.
19791
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the legitimate rights of the population of such country contrary
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
2. Economic Assistance
Corresponding to the section 502(B) prohibitions on security
assistance are the human rights sanctions incorporated into
United States foreign economic assistance programs under § 116
of the FAA of 1961 as amended" and § 112 of the Agricultural
Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 as amended
(ATDA).Y
Section 116(a) provides that:
No assistance may be provided under this part to the govern-
ment of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of
gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, in-
cluding torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment, prolonged detention without charges or other
flagrant denial of the right to life liberty, and the security of
person, unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy
people in such country."
The final clause was added to this provision because, as the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee reported, it was important to link
United States assistance to human rights, but it was equally
important not to rule out aid to needy people because they lived in
countries where they were politically oppressed.3 This attitude is
reflected in the general policy goals of the foreign assistance pro-
grams. Section 101(3) states as a principal objective "the en-
couragement of development processes in which civil and
economic rights are respected and enhanced." 7
Section 116 provides further that on request by either the
Senate Foreign Relations Committe or the Committee on Interna-
tional Relations of the House of Representatives, the Agency for
International Development (AID) must submit a written report
demonstrating how such assistance will directly benefit the needy
people in the recipient country. If either committee or either
House of Congress disagrees with the justifications provided by
" 22 U.S.C. § 2151n (a) (1979 Supp.).
7 U.S.C. § 1712 (1979 Supp.).
' 22 U.S.C. § 2151n (a) (1979 Supp.).
" S. Rep. No. 94-406, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). In addition to adopting the human
rights policy provision, the Congress intended to continue the policies of Pub. L. 93-189,
known as the "New Directions," which are aimed at directly assisting the poor in the
developing nations rather than promoting large projects and capital transfers.
'" 22 U.S.C. § 2151(a) (3) (1979 Supp.).
[Vol. 9:287
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AID, it may initiate action to terminate assistance to any country
by a concurrent resolution." Section 116(d) requires the President
to submit to Congress a written report explaining how the
assistance would directly benefit the people of a recipient
country." Finally, section 116(e) authorizes the President to use
$1,500,000 for activities to promote increased adherence to civil
and political rights as set forth in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. 0 Contemplated programs include those which help
countries to strengthen legal guarantees of human rights or to im-
prove legal assistance programs through such activities as
workshops and conferences on human rights and economic
development. 1
In addition to adding section 116 to the FAA of 1961, the Inter-
national Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977 added sec-
tion 112 to the ATDA, 2 which revised features of the Food-for-
Peace program.'" The purpose of the new section was to include
human rights considerations in decision making under Title I of
the ATDA. Section 112(a) states:
No agreement may be entered into under this title to finance
the sale of agricultural commodities to the government of any
country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross viola-
" 22 U.S.C. § 2151n (b) (1979 Supp.).
a 22 U.S.C. § 2151n (d) (1979 Supp.).
" 22 U.S.C. § 2151n (e) (1979 Supp.).
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights has gained broad acceptance as a statement
identifying basic human rights. It is neither a treaty nor an international agreement, but
rather a common standard of achievement for all of mankind. The Declaration was adopted
on December 10, 1948 by a resolution of the U.N. General Assembly. G.A. Res. 217, U.N.
Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948), reprinted in U.N. RESOLUTIONS, 135-4, (1948-9).
H.R. REP. No. 95-1087, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1978).
4 7 U.S.C. § 1712 (1979 Supp.).
a The 1954 Act is commonly referred to as the Food for Peace Program and is usually
cited by its public law citation, P.L. 480. The statute is essentially a two point assistance
law that (1) authorizes loans and grants to foreign countries so they can buy U.S. farm pro-
ducts, and (2) provides free food to foreign governments and international relief organiza-
tions. Title I of the statute requires that 75 percent of the concessional sales must go to
"poor nations." The amendments passed in 1977 maintained this formula but allowed for the
greater flexibility requested by the administration. The congressional committee took into
consideration the testimony of Secretary of Agriculture Bergland and others about the in-
creasing difficulty of administering Title I concessional sales within the limitations of the
previous law. Prior to the 1977 legislation, poor countries were defined as those with an an-
nual per capita gross national product of $300 or less based on World Bank data. Under the
present law the eligibility standard for countries in the 75 percent category is changed to
the poverty criterion of the International Development Association (IDA) which makes ad-
justments upward to account for inflation. In addition, the 75/25 percent requirement can be
waived by the President in order to effectively achieve the "humanitarian purposes" of Ti-
tle I. H.R. REP. No. 5-40, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977).
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tions of internationally recognized human rights, including tor-
ture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
prolonged detention without charges, or other flagrant denial of
the right to life, liberty, and the security of person, unless such
agreement will directly benefit the needy people in such coun-
try.44
The statute provides further that either the commodities or the
proceeds from their sale will be used for specific projects which
the President determines would directly benefit the needy poeple
of the country receiving financing. The agreement must specify
how the projects will benefit the needy. A report by the recipient
country must be submitted to the President within six months
after delivery of the commodities.
The statute speaks only generally of "projects or programs
which would directly benefit the needy people." The legislative
history provides a more specific explanation:
It is the committee's intention that the "specific projects or pro-
grams" ... should be mainly in the areas of agricultural develop-
ment, rural development, nutrition, health services, population
planning, food distribution, education and training, housing,
'public works, conservation and storage, and credit and
marketing facilities.'"
B. Financing
1. The Export-Import Bank (Eximbank)
Statutes which authorize the financing of international trade
transactions have been amended in recent years to reflect the con-
cern of members of Congress and the Carter Administration that
human rights policy considerations become a factor in the deci-
sions made concerning the authorization of credit. The most
significant legislation has dealt with the Export-Import Bank Act
of 1945.6 Perhaps this act illustrates the conflict between export
policy and human rights policy in the most striking terms. In
reporting the bill to Congress, the House Committee on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs stressed that the purposes of the
amendments were:
" 7 U.S.C. 1712(a) (1979 Supp.).
, H.R. REP. No. 95-240, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1977).
" Supra, note 14. Title XIX of the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate
Control Act of 1978 is usually cited as the Export-Import Bank Act Amendments of 1978
(P.L. 95-630). The Eximbank legislation was attached as a rider to the multipurpose finan-
cial institutions regulation bill.
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to encourage the sale of more American goods and services
overseas by extending the U.S. Export-Import Bank for 5 years
... and increasing its financial commitment authority ....
* . .to reduce this chronic foreign trade deficit
... [by] vigorous support for increased exports....
• . . [to] make U.S. companies more competitive in the world
market place and increase export significantly."
The Congressional intent is clearly to facilitate the successful
exporting of U.S. goods and services. To this end, Congress has
amended the human rights restrictions in this Act twice in the
past three years." The current amendments under section
2(b)(1)(B) stress the goal of strengthening the competitive position
of U.S. exports:
Only in cases where the President determines that such action
would be in the national interest where such action would clearly
and importantly advance United States policy in such areas as
international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, environmental
protection and human rights, should the Export-Import Bank
deny applications for credit for nonfinancial or noncommercial
considerations."
Previously, the human rights language called for the Eximbank
Board to take into account, in consultation with the Secretary of
State, the human rights practices of the country to receive the ex-
ports supported by a loan or financial guarantee, and the effect
the exports might have on human rights in the recipient country.2
The new law51 differs in two respects. First, it strengthens the
human rights language by mandating a denial of any Eximbank ac-
tivity under certain circumstances. Second, this provision is
balanced by a requirement that the President determine that a
denial will "clearly and importantly" advance United States
human rights policy. 2
" H.R. REP. No. 5-115, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1978).
" Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 (extension act), Pub. L. No. 95-143, § 2, 91 Stat. 1210
(amending 12 U.S.C. § 635(b) (1) (B) (1945)); Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest
Rate Control Act of 1978, supra note 4 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 635(b) (1) (B) (1977)).
12 U.S.C. § 635(b) (1) (B) (1979 Supp.) (emphasis added).
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 (extension act) § 2, 91 Stat. 1210 (1977) (current ver-
sion at 12 U.S.C. § 635(b) (1) (B( (1978)).
" Supra note 14. This amendment is known as the Chaffee Amendment after its principal
sponsor, Senator Chaffee of Rhode Island.
U While many policy concerns are reflected in legislation of this kind, it is interesting to
note two factors which seemed to have influenced the shift in language in the human rights
provisions. First, in the period between the passage of tje two amendments, United States
leaders became increasingly fearful of the economic consequences of the ever-increasing
19791 297
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2. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974
The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 19745 pro-
hibits the extension of credit by the United States government to
any non-market country which denies or limits its citizens the
right or opportunity to emigrate. The amendment also prohibits
the President from granting most-favored-nation treatment to, or
from making any commercial agreement with, any country which
makes such denials or imposes more than a nominal tax on im-
migration. An amendment to section 402 gives the President the
authority to waive these restrictions for 18 months if he has
received assurances that the emigration practices in the future
will achieve the objectives of the Amendment, and the waiver will
further promote them, as well. Subsequent extensions can be con-
trade deficit in this country. This led to a shift in policy emphasis toward a strong export
program. Thus, the statement of purpose to the 1978 bill outlined economic problems and
called for a stronger Eximbank over the next five years. H.R. REP. 95-1115, supra note 47,
at 2. In contrast, the 1977 Act extended the authority of the bank for a short period of time,
emphasized the debate over human rights, and urged that efforts be made to reach
agreements with other countries to reduce and eventually eliminate the use of government-
supported export financing. H.R. REP. No. 95-235, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977).
A second factor seems to have been the change in administration. In 1977 the Subcommit-
tee on International Trade, Investment and Monetary Policy devoted considerable effort to
the debate over the most effective means of advancing the cause of human rights through
export credit policy. The committee settled on the 1977 language only after rejecting a
series of amendments offered by Representative Herman Badillo that would have added
additional requirements to the human rights provisions in the bill. The rejection of the
tougher language reflected to a degree the view of the committee that denial of Eximbank
support would have little impact on the human rights of the recipient countries since Exim-
bank is an export promotion institution and not an aid agency. The committee also believed
that a flexible provision in the hands of an administration with a more credible commitment
to human rights would, in the long run, be a more effective policy tool.
5 Supra note 15. § 2403(a) states:
To assure the continued dedication of the United States to fundamental human
rights, and notwithstanding any other provision of law, on or after the date of the
enactment of this Act products from any non-market economy country shall not
be eligible to receive nondiscriminatory treatment (most-favored-nation-
treatment), such country shall not participate in any program of the government
of the United States which extends credits or credit quarantees or investment
quarantees, directly or indirectly, and the President of the United States shall not
conclude any commercial agreement with any such country, during the period
beginning with the date on which the President determines that such country-
(1) denies its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate;
(2) imposes more than a nominal tax on emigration or on the visas or
other documents required for emigration, for any purpose or cause
whatsover; or
(3) imposes more than a nominal tax, levy, fine, fee, or other charge on
any citizen to emigrate to the country of his choice,
and ending on the date on which the President determines that such country is no
longer in violation of paragraph (1), (2) or (3).
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tinued by executive order at one-year intervals unless either
house of Congress passes a resolution of disapproval."
3. International Financial Institutions (IFIs)
Amendments-to the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development Act" establish human rights criteria for action
taken by U.S. representatives at meetings of IFIs." Title VII of
the Act provides in Section 701(a) that:
The United States Government in connection with its voice and
vote in [the IFIs], shall advance the cause of human rights, in-
cluding by seeking to channel assistance toward countries other
than those whose governments engage in-
(1) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights, such as torture or cruel, inhumane, or
degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention
without charges, or other flagrant denial of life, liberty, and the
security of person; or
(2) provide refuge to individuals committing acts of interna-
tional terrorism by hijacking aircraft. 7
s, 19 U.S.C. § 2432(d)(1) (1979 Supp.). This amendment was a result of the urging of
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who by letter to Senator Jackson pointed out that
without such a waiver provision, § 402 was unacceptable to the administration and further,
he had been assured by the Soviets that emigration practices would improve in the future.
S. REP. No. 93-1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). In a December 3, 1974 appearance before
the Senate Finance Committee Kissinger pointed out that the compromise did not reflect
"formal government agreements" between the two countries but was based on "clarifica-
tions of Soviet domestic practices from Soviet leaders." 32 CONG. Q. 66 (Dec. 7, 1974).
5 Supra note 16.
There are four multilateral development banks including the World Bank, the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the African
Development Bank (AFDB). According to the overview of IFI's produced by the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, the United States joined the first part of the World Bank,
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in 1945. Thereafter, two other
organizations were created as part of the World Bank, the International Finance Corpora-
tion and the International Development Association. The United States joined these in 1955
and 1960 respectively. In 1959 the United States joined the IDB and in 1966, the ADB. The
AFDB membership is restricted to countries of the region it serves, but the United States
did join the African Development Fund in 1976.
The committee defined the purpose of the development banks to be the amassing of
capital to be lent to governments of less developed countries for the purpose of economic
development. Loans to the 'wealthier' less developed countries are made at rates equal to
the cost of the money to the IFI plus technical and administrative costs (hard loans). Those
to the very poor less developed countries are made on concessionary terms (soft loans). S.
REP. No. 95-159, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1977).
'7 22 U.S.C. 262(d) (1979 Supp.). § 262d(e) elaborates on the definition of 'gross violations':
In determining whether a country is in gross violation of internationally
recognized human rights standards as defined by the provisions of subsection (a),
the United States government shall give consideration to the extent of coopera-
tion of such country in permitting an unimpeded investigation of alleged viola-
300 GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. [Vol. 9:287
Section 701(c) requires that the Secretaries of State and
Treasury submit an annual report to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate on the progress
made toward achieving the goals of Title VII. Section 701(f)
authorizes and instructs the United States Directors of the IFIs to
"4oppose"5M any loan, any extension of financial assistance, or any
technical assistance to any country described in 701(a), unless such
assistance is directed specifically to programs which serve the
basic human needs of the citizens of the country.
The passage of Title VII was accompanied by an unusual coali-
tion of interests, described by one observer as an "unholy alliance:
pro-aid liberals waving high the early Carter banner of muscular
public virtue, and anti-aid conservatives figuring to sink develop-
ment aid under an unbearable load of human rights." 9 An earlier
proposal would have required an automatic "no" vote against any
loan to a country where human rights are violated.'
The language finally adopted was contained in an amendment
sponsored by the late Senator Humphrey and Representative
Reuss and supported by the Carter Administration. The language
requires the government to consider human rights issues but does
not legislate a specific course of action. This gives the United
States the flexibility in bargaining needed to improve human
rights conditions in recipient countries."1
tions of internationally recognized human rights by appropriate international
organizations including, but not limited to, the International Committee of the
Red Cross, Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, and
groups or persons acting under the authority of the United Nations or the
Organization of American States.
The term oppose can mean voting "no," voting "present," abstaining, or taking any ac-
tion other than voting "yes." H. CONF. REP. No. 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977).
Jawboning on Human Rights, Wash. Post, Apr. 23, 1977 at 10, col. 1.
The amendment, proposed by Representative Badillo, was approved by voice in the
House in April 1977. It was based on a bill signed by President Ford in 1976 (PUB. L. No.
94-302, commonly known as the Harkin Amendment) that required United States officials to
vote against aid proposals by the Inter-American Development Bank and the African
Development Fund if the country involved violated its citizen's human rights. The Senate
amendment containing the Harkin language, proposed by Senators Abourezk and
Hatfield,was defeated by a seven-vote margin (43-50).
"1 President Carter voiced his concern over the House language in a news conference on
April 15, 1977:
I think the Harkin amendment is a mistake. The Reuss amendment and the
Senator Humphrey amendment, which are the same, provide me with an ade-
quate authority to deal with the question of human rights as it relates to interna-
tional and regional lending institutions. To have a frozen mandatory prohibition
against our nation voting for any loan simply removes my ability to bargain with
a foreign leader whom we think might be willing to ease off on the deprivation of
human rights.
35 CONG. Q. 758, (April 23, 1977).
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Two other amendments dealing with human rights concerns
and relating to financing institutions were passed in 1978. Section
611 of the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropria-
tions Act of 1979 contains a directive to the United States Govern-
ment to propose and seek adoption of an amendment to the
charters of the IFIs to establish human rights standards to be con-
sidered in connection with each application for assistance.2
Human rights amendments were also attached to recent legisla-
tion authorizing United States participation in the Supplementary
Financing Facility (popularly known as the Witteveen Facility)8 of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF)." Under section 30(a) of
the Bretton Woods Agreement Act, the director of the IMF is
directed "to initiate a wide consultation" with the managing direc-
tor of the Fund and other member country directors to formulate
stabilization programs which "foster a broader base of productive
investment and employment especially in the productive activities
which are designed to meet basic human needs." Section 30(b) re-
quires an annual report evaluating the effect of policies of those
countries which result from the Witteveen Facility Agreements.
An additional report is required under section 31, as defined in
section 116(a) of the FAA of 1961.
The Overseas Private Investment Corporation Amendments
Act of 1978" extended the authority of OPIC and modified the
statutory guidelines for its programs. 67 Among the modifications
The President elaborated in a letter to Senator Humphrey:
... there may well be times when we can bargain with prospective borrowers to
release prisoners or stop other offensive practices if we have our vote as lever-
age .... Moreover, if we want other bank members to vote with us, we must be
able to work with them and vote with them - not just automatically vote "no" at
the outset.
S. REP. No. 95-159, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1977).
' 22 U.S.C. § 262(d) note as amended by Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Ap-
propriations Act, 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-481, Title VI, § 611, 92 Stat. 1602.
" 22 U.S.C. §§ 286(e-9), 286(e-10) (1979 Supp.), as amended by Bretton Woods Agreements
Act - Financing Facility, Pub. L. 95-435, § 4, 92 Stat. 1052.
" The purpose of the Witteveen Facility is to provide supplementary IMF financing
needs. Such needs have arisen out of the large payments imbalance caused by the
astronomical rise in international oil prices decreed by the Organization of Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries (OPEC). S. REP. No. 95-603, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978).
U 22 U.S.C. § 286(e-10) (1979 Supp.).
" 22 U.S.C. §§ 2199, 2200(a) (1979 Supp.).
" The Committee on International Relations outlined the basic OPIC programs including-
Investment insurance
The heart of the OPIC programs is political risk insurance authorized by sec-
tion 234(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, under which OPIC provides in-
surance against the risks of (1) expropriation, (2) inconvertibility, and (3) war,
revolution, and insurrection.
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was a human rights provision which makes section 116 of the FAA
of 1961 applicable to any insurance, reinsurance, guaranty, or loan
issued by OPIC. Two exceptions are cited: the section 116 excep-
tion for programs benefitting needy people and an exception based
on national security interests." The Act also calls for an annual
report that must include a description of any project for which
OPIC refused financial support on human rights grounds as well
as a description of any project receiving OPIC insurance or sup-
port by reason of one of the above exceptions. 9
C. Licensing of Exports
1. Military Export Licensing
Human rights concerns are reflected in legislation regulating
military export licensing. These exports require government ap-
proved licenses before they may be shipped. Section 502B(a)(2) 0
discussed in II, A., 1 of this Note prohibits security assistance
from being provided to governments engaged in a consistent pat-
tern of gross violations of human rights. Security assistance, in
this context, includes licensing for the export of defense-related
Investment Guaranties
Section 234(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 authorizes OPIC to pro-
vide guarantees of loans and other investments against loss due to such risks as
OPIC may determine. The guarantees are against both political and commercial
risks ....
Under the investment insurance program, most of the investment projects
which OPIC insures are developed independently by the private sector and a for-
mal application is made for OPIC coverage after the project is already conceived
or under construction. In contrast, under the investment guaranty program,
OPIC frequently plays the role of investment broker, by actively seeking financ-
ing to capitalize a partially developed investment project.
Direct investment
[This] program is intended to provide financing for projects which are commer-
cially feasible but for which sufficient commercial capital is not available on
satisfactory terms.
Investment encouragement
Section 234(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 authorized OPIC to initiate
and support through financial participation, incentive grant, or otherwise the
identification, assessment, surveying, and promotion of private investment oppor-
tunities. OPIC [will] underwrite 50 percent of the cost of project feasibility
surveys.
H.R. No. 95-670, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 4 (1978).
* 22 U.S.C. § 2199(1) (1979 Supp.).
" 22 U.S.C. § 2200(a) (2) (A), (B) (1979 Supp.).
" 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (2) (1979 Supp.).
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goods and services. The sanction applies to all munitions sales in-
cluding Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and commercial munitions
sales. Foreign Military Sales are transacted on a government to
government basis while commercial munitions sales are
negotiated directly between the manufacturer and the purchaser.
Another human rights provision relating to licensing of military
exports empowers the President to disqualify a developing coun-
try from purchasing United States munitions through the FMS
program if he finds that a country is diverting economic develop-
ment assistance for military purchases. Such a ban may be impos-
ed only if the diversion materially interferes with the country's
development.
71
2. Commercial Export Licensing
The EAA72 is the statute which empowers various actors in the
Executive Branch to review commercial export licensing. These
actors include the President, the Departments of State, Com-
merce, Defense, Treasury and Energy, the National Security
Council, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration. The administration of ex-
ports under the EAA is centralized to some extent in the Export
Administration Office of the Department of Commerce, but at
higher levels of decision-making the bureaucracy is essentially an
interagency creature.
Under the EAA, exports can be controlled:
(A) to the extent necessary to protect the domestic economy
from the excessive drain of scarce materials and to reduce the
serious inflationary impact of foreign demand, (B) to the extent
necessary to further significantly the foreign policy of the
United States and to fulfill its international responsibilities and
(C) to the extent necessary to exercise the necessary vigilance
over exports from the standpoint of their significance to the na-
tional security of the United States."8
Human rights factors come into play as an element of foreign
policy under (B).
All items exported under this act require either a general or a
validated license before export. The two licenses have the same
legal effect. However, in contrast to the general licensing pro-
" 22 U.S.C. § 2775 (1974).
- 22 U.S.C. § 2401 (1979 Supp.).
22 U.S.C. § 2402(2) (1979 Supp.).
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cedure which is very simple, the process of obtaining a validated
license is time consuming and requires prior approval by the Ex-
port Administration Office or one of the higher levels of review.7"
Under the authority of the Act", the Secretary of Commerce is
responsible for issuing regulations that determine which items to
which destinations will require a validated license. The items
which require validated licenses are usually high-technology pro-
ducts destined for non-market countries. While the reason given
for delay in, or denial of, the granting of a validated license is
generally national security, human rights considerations are at
times significant.
A more specific basis for commercial export controls for crime
control and detection instruments is found in Section 4 of the
EAA.7 New subsection (m)(1) requires that such items be approv-
ed for export by the Secretary of Commerce pursuant to a
validated export license. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
listed under the category such items as leg irons, shackles, thumb-
screws, stock batons, straitjackets, psychological stress analysis
equipment, dart guns, bulletproof vests, ultraviolet detection
equipment and other equipment of similar usefulness.7
D. Special Treatment for Specific Nations
In addition to the general human rights provisions outlined
above, there are some statutory restrictions which apply to
specific human rights violators. The more important of these pro-
visions are discussed briefly below.
1. The Soviet Union
Section 8(b) of the Export-Import Bank Amendments of 1974
prohibits the approval of any loans or financial guarantees in con-
nection with .exports to the Soviet Union in an aggregate amount
in excess of $300,000,000. The President may establish a limit in
excess of this amount if he determines that a higher limit is in the
national interest and the Congress adopts a concurrent resolution
approving such a determination. 8
7 15 C.F.R. § 399.1 et seq. (published separately).
,1 22 U.S.C. § 2403 (1979 Supp.).
11 22 U.S.C. § 2401 (1979 Supp.) (as amended by International Security Assistance Act of
1978, Pub. L. 95-384, § 6(2), 92 Stat. 730).
77 S. REP. No. 95-841, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1978).
" 12 U.S.C. § 635e(b) (1978). This provision is known as the "Stephenson Amendment"
after its sponsor, Senator Adlai Stephenson. It is important to note that this limitation has
no practical effect unless the Jackson-Vanik Amendment sanction prohibiting the extension
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2. Uruguay
In October 1976, Congress passed Section 505 of the Foreign
Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1977."' It
stipulated that no funds appropriated under the Act could be used
to provide military assistance, international military education
and training, or foreign military credit sales to Uruguay.
3. Chile
Strict bans against military assistance under the FAA of 1961
as well as sales, credits, or loan guarantees under the Arms Ex-
port Control Act have been enforced against Chile since 1976.80
This law followed previous less stringent limits on military and
economic assistance. 81
4. Uganda
Section 4(m) of the EAA prohibits exports to Uganda until a
Presidential determination is made that the government of Uganda
is no longer engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of
human rights." Section 5 of the 1978 Amendments to the Bretton
Woods Agreements Act prohibits the importing of goods produc-
ed or manufactured in Uganda until a similar Presidential deter-
mination is made.' A less forceful provision, Section 610(d) of the
of credit to non-market countries including the Soviet Union is waived, as provided by the
Amendment. To date, the prohibition against the Soviet Union has not been waived. For a
discussion of proposed legislation concerning both Amendments see text at notes 183-85, in-
fra.
" Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1977, Pub. L. 94-441,
Title V, § 505, 90 Stat. 1465 (1977).
" The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L.
94-329, § 406, 90 Stat. 729 (1976). The Committee on International Relations defined the
limits of this prohibition as follows:
The prohibition does not extend to cash sales under the Foreign Military Sales
Act or to commercial sales of nizlitary equipment to Chile. This section thus ter-
minates all U.S. financial support for the Chilean military, but does not jeopardize
regional stability by depriving Chile of access to defense articles and defense ser-
vices needed for its defense and paid for with its own resources. Any cash sales to
Chile will, of course, be subject to congressional review under Section 36(b) of the
Foreign Military Sales Act and under the new 502(B) of the Foreign Assistance
Act.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1144, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 1976).
" Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-559, § 25, 88 Stat. 1795 (1974); International
Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-161, § 320, 89 Stat. 849 (1975).
" 22 U.S.C. § 2151n.
" 22 U.S.C. § 2151n. Bretton Woods Financing Act, Pub. L. 95-435, § 5(c), (e) 92 Stat. 1051
(1978).
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Foreign Relations Authorization Act," expresses the sense of Con-
gress that the President should prohibit the export of military
and police equipment to Uganda and submit a resolution to the U.N.
Security Council calling for an arms embargo against Uganda.
5. Argentina
The Kennedy Amendment prohibits grants of military
assistance, military training, or security-supporting assistance to
Argentina under the FAA of 1961. Credits, loan guarantees, and
sales of defense articles under the Arms Export Control Act are
also disallowed. No export licenses may be issued under Section
38 of the Arms Export Control Act to or for the Government of
Argentina. This prohibition came into effect after September 30,
1978.
6. South Africa
Section 2(b)(8) of the Export Import Bank Act, as amended, pro-
hibits Eximbank credits to the government of South Africa or its
agencies until significant progress toward the elimination of apar-
theid, as determined by the President, has been made."6 Another
prohibition applies to all transactions in South Africa, whether
with the Government or a national or an agency, which would con-
tribute to enabling the government of South Africa to maintain or
enforce apartheid. 7 A third clause prohibits the extension of
credit in support of any export to other purchasers in South
Africa unless the purchasers implement fair employment prin-
ciples."
U Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1978, Pub. L. 95-426, § 610, 95 Stat.
963 (1978).
' 22 U.S.C. § 2372 (Supp. 1979).
" Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L.
95-630, § 1915, 92 Stat. 3641 (1978) (to be codified as' 12 U.S.C. § 635(b) (8)).
" In a letter to then Representative Paul Tsongas who sponsored this amendment, John
Moore, President of the Bank, clarified the understanding of the Bank on the matter:
Based on the legislative history established during the subcommittee's discus-
sions of this amendment, it is our understanding that the amendment includes
guarantees, insurance, and credits in connection with a sale to any national or
agency of the Republic of South Africa.
This language is to be codified in 12 U.S.C. 635(b) (8).
Specifically, the statute states that credit will be denied to such purchasers unless:
The United States Secretary of State certifies that the purchaser has endorsed
and has proceeded toward the implementation of the following principles:
nonsegregation of the races in all work facilities; equal and fair employment for
all employees; equal pay for equal work for all employees; initiation and develop-
ment of training programs to prepare nonwhite South Africans for supervisory,
administrative, clerical, and technical jobs; increasing the number of nonwhites in
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7. Miscellaneous Human Rights Violators
The International Development and Food Assistance Act of
1978 includes, in Section 602, prohibitions against the use of funds
authorized to be appropriated under the Act to aid Vietnam, Cam-
bodia, Uganda, or Cuba. 9 The Act appropriates funds for the FAA
of 1961 for fiscal year 1979. The ban against aid includes both
monetary payments and the sale or transfer of any goods of any
nature.
Section 108 of the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs
Appropriations Act of 19790 provides that:
none of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available to
this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any
assistance or reparations to Uganda, Cambodia, Laos, or Viet-
nam.
This Act funded the FAA of 1961 through September 30, 1979.
Section 114 imposes a similar ban against Mozambique and
Angola.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
Since the initial days of the Carter Administration, the frequency
and intensity of government human rights statements have declin-
ed somewhat. In attempting in this section of the Note to explain
how human rights policy is effected, the question of the extent to
which the Carter Administration's original emphasis on human
rights issues has continuing significance shall also be addressed.
Although it is possible to understand generally how human
rights policy is effected, the specifics of the review procedure re-
main unclear except, perhaps, to the participants. Analysis is
hampered by the secretive atmosphere in which the deliberations
proceed, by the paucity of published material on the procedures
and by the inadequacy of information on the roles of the various
human rights actors.' Further, the programs affected by human
management and supervisory positions; a willingness to engage in collective
bargaining with labor unions; and improving the quality of life for employees in
such areas as housing, transportation, schooling, recreation, and health facilities.
International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1978, 95-424, § 602, 92 Stat. 937
(1978).
Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1979, 95-481, § 108, 92
Stat. 1591 (1979).
" Much of the information presented in this section was collected in interviews and con-
versations with persons involved with the procedures described. Two documents relied on
extensively are COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAS, HUMAN RIGHTS PROCEDURES AND ORGANIZATION IN
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rights considerations have different decisional processes, and
vary in degrees of formality. Thus, while the explanation of
statutes relevant to human rights is fairly clear, discrete and
straight-forward, this explanation of human rights policy im-
plementation is perforce somewhat vague.
A. Agency Actors
The primary forums for decisions on .export-related foreign
policy action are the Interagency Group for Human Rights and
Foreign Assistance (referred to by some as the "Christopher Com-
mittee" but identified here as the IG)" and its Human Rights
Working Group, 8 the Arms Export Control Board" (AECB) and
its Arms Transfer Policy Planning Working Group, 5 and the Of-
fice of Munitions Control in the State Department's Bureau of
Politico-Military Affairs (PM/MC). The Bureau of Human Rights
and Humanitarian Affairs (HA) in the State Department plays an
important advisory role before these groups. It should be
understood from the outset that the functions of these groups are
not clearly defined and vary somewhat depending on the subject
matter brought before each group.
1. Interagency Group for Human Rights and Foreign
Assistance (IG)
IG, created by a 1977 National Security Council directive,"
passes on decisions regarding bilateral and multilateral foreign
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT (Nov. 1978) [hereinafter cited as HUMAN RIGHTS PROCEDURES], and
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENSE DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 95th
CONG., 2d SESS., UNITED STATES ARMS TRANSFER AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
(Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter cited as ARMS TRANSFER].
" The Interagency Group is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of State and is comprised
of representatives from the Departments of Treasury, Defense and Agriculture, the Bureau
for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (HA) and other bureaus within the State
Department, the Agency for International Development (AID), the National Security Coun-
cil (NSC), Eximbank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and other
departments and agencies when necessary.
" This working group is co-chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Rights
and the Director of the Office of Devlopment Finance of the Bureau of Economic and
Business Affairs, with representatives from the Regional Affairs Offices in HA, the Policy
Planning Staff, Treasury, OPIC and other concerned agencies.
" This board is chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science
and Technology, with representatives from the Department of Treasury, Defense and other
areas of State, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, NSC, Central
Intelligence Agency, AID and Office of Management and Budget.
" Thia group is chaired by the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs with
similar representatives to the Arms Export Control Board.
* HUMAN RIGHTS PROCEDURES, supfla note 91, at 6.
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assistance. Bilateral foreign assistance includes Eximbank and
OPIC transactions, Title I Food-for-Peace projects, and FMS
credits. Multilateral foreign assistance is exemplified by IFI and
International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans.
IG decides to approve, delay limit or deny a project based on a
number of factors including not only a recipient country's human
rights conditions and trends but also U.S. concerns in the areas of
national security, antiterrorism, nuclear non-proliferation and
labor practices, as well as the recipient's expropriation history.
HA, the lead advocate of human rights concerns among IG's par-
ticipants, has only the power to make recommendations before
this group.
After determining a course of action to be taken, IG will contact
the agency, bureau or department responsible for administering
the project and inform it of the IG's decision. It is not clear
whether the administering organization is bound by IG's decision,
though there has been no indication of non-compliance thus far. It
is also unclear whether the Deputy Secretary of State is bound by
IG action or may treat it as merely advisory. There is uncertainty
as to whether the agency's procedures are formal or informal.
The Human Rights Working Group, which is comprised of
representatives similar to those on IG, has decision-making power
for routine projects. If an agreement within the group is achieved,
the decision is sent to the responsible agency for implementation.
If the group members are in disagreement, the issue is brought
before the IG for resolution.
2. Arms Export Control Board (AECB)
The AECB is an advisory group to the Departments of State
and Defense and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. It
was designed to streamline the licensing review procedure of
FMS program sales (government to government arms sales) and
to coordinate the involvement of the review participants. Its five
working groups consider a broad range of topics, including human
rights, and relate their recommendations to the Board. The work-
ing group considering human rights is the Arms Transfer Policy
Planning Working Group. Like the AECB itself, it does not have
any determinative power.
3. Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (PM/MC)
PM/MC is the bureau responsible for coordinating regional
ARMS TRANSFER, supra note 91, at 76-7.
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defense and foreign policy matters communicated from various
Defense Department and State Department bureaus. It also
makes decisions on the licensing of munitions exports sold directly
by U.S. manufacturers to foreign purchasers. These sales, known
as commercial munitions sales, do not require the government to
act as an intermediary.
When disagreement over appropriate action occurs within the
groups discussed above, an attempt is made to reconcile the
divergent views. If this effort fails, the dispute escalates, in un-
predictable fashion, to higher levels in each department
represented in the group. Should the discord persist at these
levels, the President must determine whether to approve or disap-
prove an export transaction.
4. The Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (HA)
HA is responsible for voicing, in an advisory capacity, United
States human rights concerns before IG, AECB and PMIMC.
Significantly, HA does not have a final say on the relative impor-
tance that a particular interest entrusted to it will play in general
foreign policy. Hence, the enforcement of human rights is not dic-
tated by the strongest human rights bureaucratic advocate but is
determined by an administrative process in which HA is but one
participant. Competing interests in the State Department act as a
check upon the free exercise of human rights policy.
Aside from its power to make recommendations to decision-
making bodies," HA can take U.S. diplomats abroad to convey to
their foreign hosts U.S. concern for the foreign nation's human
rights situation. This keeps a continuous flow of information about
U.S. policy available to foreign nations. Indeed, this may be the
only channel of expression open to HA when other foreign policy
interests make action undesirable.
In order to clarify its general course of action in dealing with a
violating nation, HA has developed a sequential list of initiatives
which it will recommend, beginning with those which have little
impact on U.S. trade and aid programs in a foreign country and
ending with those which will have a significant effect on such pro-
" Its recommendations are based upon information on human rights practices gleaned
from a number of sources, such as other State Department bureaus, the Central In-
telligence Agency and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). For an informative explica-
tion of the data collection methods of NGOs, see Note, The Role of Nongrovernmental
Organizations in Implementing Human Rights in Latin America, 7 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
477, 488 (1977).
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grams. Naturally any determination made by HA will depend on
the degree of influence the U.S. wields in the country in question.
As a first step, HA will recommend that concern over an offend-
ing nation's policy be communicated through diplomatic channels.
Should the country fail to make any attempt to ameliorate the
situation, HA will make recommendations to the decisional
groups, to reduce or cut off, in the following order: a) military
grants and government-financed Foreign Military Sales, b)
privately financed Foreign Military Sales and commercial muni-
tions sales, c) military training for that nation's troops, d) bilateral
economic assistance, and e) multilateral economic assistance. As a
last resort, HA will recommend limiting, delaying or denying com-
mercial export transactions. When this last stage is reached, HA
will distinguish between those importers in the violating nation
which are governmental agencies and those which are private
businesses."
B. Appropriations
The broad reach of § 502(B) of the FAA of 196111 extends to
economic and security assistance programs in both the legislative
and executive branches of the U.S. government. Congress ap-
propriates funds to various bilateral and multilateral aid pro-
grams, 1 1 weighing its human rights commitment against other
political factors. 2 The executive branch administrators of these
" Address by Barbara Bowie, Human Rights Officer, Bureau of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State, to the Milwaukee World Trade Association,
(Oct. 31, 1978) (on file at the Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law)
[hereinafter cited as Bowie Speech).
'® Supra note 24.
IC! The number of foreign aid programs for which funds are appropriated is quite large.
Under the category of security assistance is the Military Assistance Program (MAP),
Redistributed MAP, International Military Education and Training (IMET), Excess Defense
Articles (EDA), Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits, Ship transfers, Facilities Transfers,
AID Public Safety Assistance, P.L. 480 Common Defense Funds, International Narcotics
Control, Military Assistance Advisory Groups and Military Groups, and Military
Assistance Service-Funded (MASF. Commercial munitions sales do not require any govern-
ment appropriations.
Economic assistance requiring appropriations or authorized funds include the numerous
AID-administered projects in th areas of agricultural development in rural areas,
agricultural research, education and human resources, population planning health, technical
assistance, housing guarantees and security support assistance, P.L. 480 - Food-for-Peace,
Eximbank transactions, OPIC transactions, Commodity Credit Corporation transactions,
loans from the IFIs and the IMF. See LATIN AMERICAN CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, FISCAL YEAR 1978, PART 1
(1978).
'" For a recent example of this process, see the House floor debate over H.R. 12514 and
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programs are legally bound to allocate these program funds con-
sistently with the empowering legislation. Consistent deviation
from legislative aims may result in either greater Congressional
oversight of the program, or major reduction in its over-all ap-
propriations. Congress has been expanding its role in enforcing
human rights policy"' by use of bans and appropriations legisla-
tion, indicating a dissatisfaction with the amount of attention paid
to human rights in the implementation of these foreign aid pro-
grams.
A discussion of the implementation of economic assistance pro-
grams which benefit U.S. exports inevitably involves an analysis
of financing programs since such aid programs are based to a
large extent on providing financing to foreign countries. Financ-
ing programs are discussed below in Section III C. of this Note.
The implementation of human rights sanctions against appropria-
tions of security assistance is taken up in Section III D. on Licens-
ing.
C. Financing
Several programs and institutions have been set up to provide
financing to foreign businesses and governments. Title I of Food-
for-Peace and Eximbank transactions have as their main purpose
the development and expansion of foreign markets for U.S.
goods.1 ' Although increasing U.S. exports is not a primary pur-
pose of OPIC or the IFIs, these programs provide financing which
could have a beneficial effect on our export posture. 13
All of these programs are conducted under the aegis of foreign
policy and are thus subject to the declaration of Section 502(B)
that a principal goal of U.S. foreign policy shall be to promote in-
Representative Lagomarsino's discussion of alleged human rights violations of Greek
Cypriots by the Turkish government and the defense considerations of lifting the Turkish
arms embargo in 124 CONG. REC. H7541 (daily ed. July 31, 1978).
10 See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2372 (the Kanedy Amendment).
',See 7 U.S.C. § 1691 (1979 Supp.) and 12 U.S.C. § 635(b) (1) (A) (1979 Supp.).
1 But see 22 U.S.C. § 2191(2) (h) (1979 Supp.), which directs OPIC to further balance of
payments and employment objectives of the U.S. and (2) (i) which compels OPIC to conduct
its activities in consonance with the international trade, investment and financial policies of
the U.S. government. These purposes are not the primiauy ones, however. The economic and
social development of the recipient countries is the central aim. See 22 U.S.C. § 2191(1)
(1979 Supp.)
In the sections describing the U.S. goals in the IFIs, See 22 U.S.C. §§ 262(c), 262(d),
262(d-1), 262(f), 262(g) and 262(h) (1979 Supp.), there is no mention of expanding U.S. exports.
Indeed, the only element of the goals relevant to U.S. exports is 22 U.S.C. § 262(f) which
declares that the U.S. shall use its voice in the IFIs to promote the utilization of light
capital technologies.
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creased observance of human rights of all countries. Section 116
covers OPIC activity generally. Additionally, each of these pro-
grams has human rights language specifically placed in its em-
powering legislation.
1. Title I of P.L. 480 (Food-for-Peace)
Sales of available U.S. agricultural commodities may be made to
friendly countries under Title I of P.L. 480.17 Credits for Title I
sales'08 (and private commercial commodity sales1") may be ex-
tended by the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), a govern-
mentally created and administered commodities financing facility.
Title I sales begin with an agreement between the U.S. govern-
ment and a foreign government. Then the U.S. Department of
Agriculture buys the required commodities on the open market,
using CCC financing. The State Department and AID are respon-
sible for the distribution of the food. The foreign government then
purchases the commodities on credit and sells them to local mer-
chants.' The proceeds may be invested in development projects
and repayment may be made over long periods of time. 10
Although the CCC may supply concessionary financing, the prices
at which Title I sales are transacted are usually close to U.S.
market price.'
The Department of Agriculture is responsible for determining
how much food to make available for Title I sales. IG, although
rarely reviewing private commercial commodity sales financed by
the CCC, routinely examines Title I sales. The Department of
Agriculture's criteria for deciding on the amount of food to pur-
chase for P.L. 480 projects do not include human rights.'12 It is
only the distribution decided on by IG that will bear the mark of
human rights policy.
'0 7 U.S.C. § 1703(d) (1979 Supp.).
IM 7 U.S.C. § 1702 (1979 Supp.).
106 7 U.S.C. § 1707(a) (1979 Supp.).
' 7 U.S.C. § 1706(b) (1979 Supp.).
110 7 U.S.C. § 1704 (1979 Supp.).
' 7 U.S.C. § 1706 (1976 Supp.) states that repayment for such sales shall be on terms as
favorable to the U.S. as the foreign nation's economy will permit but in no event less than
the minimum rate established by 22 U.S.C. § 2151(t) (three percent per year commencing at
not less than ten years following the time the funds are committed and two percent for the
interim).
" The criteria are: productive capacity, domestic requirements, farm and consumer
price levels, anticipated commercial exports and adequate carryover. Agricultural Rural
Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Fiscal Year 1980, Hearings before the
Senate Comm. on Appropriations, Part I Justifications 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1153 (1979).
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One of the mandates of the P.L. 480 program is that reasonable
precautions be taken to safeguard usual marketing of U.S.
agricultural goods against undue disruption of normal patterns of
commercial trade with friendly countries.118 When the implementa-
tion of the human rights provisions"' results in the blockage of
CCC loans, (as in 1977 when a $10,000,000 CCC surplus wheat loan
to a Latin American nation was blocked),115 some disruption of
usual marketing must occur. In enforcing the human rights sanc-
tions in this area, IG must attempt to keep such disruptions to a
minimum.
2. Eximbank
Eximbank is a critical valve in the flow of U.S. goods to foreign
nations. Implementation of human rights provisions contained in
the Eximbank legislation thus has a significant effect on U.S.
trade.1 Eximbank financing for exports exists in the following
forms: (1) direct loans to the foreign importer, (2) guarantees to
U.S. commercial banks holding export debt, (3) export credit in-
surance for the exporter and commercial banks for both political
and commercial risks, (4) lines of credit to foreign banks financing
U.S. exports and (5) discount loans to commercial banks. 7 It offers
these services under varying terms, the most significant of these
being the long term direct loans carrying fixed interest rates,
where commercial bank participation is limited.18
Eximbank itself is presently aggressively seeking to promote
U.S. exports by providing an array of services most responsive to
the needs of U.S. exporters.1 However, Eximbank's efforts are
hindered by a perception by exporters that it imposes "'political,'
protectionist and other restraints on its operations . . . ."'I From
1 7 U.S.C. 1703(c).
114 7 U.S.C. § 1722 (1979 Supp.).
.1 McBee, Little-Known Group Has Toughened US. Rights Action, Wash. Post, Dec. 17,
1977, A17 at col. 1.
"I A commercial export may be financed through non-Eximbank sources, but there is no
substitute for a required export license.
1 12 U.S.C. § 635(b) (1) (B) (1979 Supp.).
... MACHINERY AND ALLIED PRODUCTS INSTITUTE, A HANDBOOK ON FINANCING U.S. EXPORTS
8-13 (2d ed. 1976).
,' See generally, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE U.S. CON-
GRESS ON EXPORT CREDIT COMPETITION AND THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES.
FOR TMHE P RIOD OCTOBER 1, 1977 THROUGH MARCH 31, 1978 (1978) (hereinafter cited to as Ex-
IMBANK).
' Id. at 25 (1978). The suggestion of avoiding such restraints, which presumably include
human rights, occurred eigth on a list of ten suggestions frequently made by exporters
surveyed.
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October 1977 to March 1978 Eximbank, as a matter of policy,
withheld direct loans to Chile and Uruguay for human rights
reasons."' However, on a discretionary basis IG instructed
Eximbank to delay its issuance of a letter of interest for the long
term financing of a $270 million sale of turbine equipment
manufactured by Allis-Chalmers Corporation to an Argentinian
governmental entity in July of 1978.11 At that time, all credits to
Argentina were being delayed. Three months later, all the credits
were approved and Allis-Chalmer's letter of interest was issued'1
when Argentina consented to an inspection by the Inter-American
Human Rights Commission.1 '
Since the enactment of the new amendment,1 IG has not
denied, delayed or limited any transaction application for human
rights reasons to Argentina or Chile."' There have been no
applications for transactions involving Uruguay so it is unclear
whether an application by this country would be authorized.
Legislated restrictions remain in place on Eximbank's ability to
finance exports to South Africa.12 It is agreed within the human
rights bureaucracy that under the new amendment, any negative
action on an Eximbank matter must be taken by the President
personally. Thus IG does not possess the authority it once wield-
ed, but now has just an advisory role.
" Id. at appendix 38 (1978). The report's only specific mention of a denial is that of $10.2
million power transmission loan request to a public buyer in Uruguay.
'" A Human Rights Officer from HA explained that this sale met all the criteria for ac-
tion:
1. Argentina had a record of severe human rights abuses.
2. Argentina had not responded to U.S. human rights concerns about its situa-
tion.
3. The reduction of bilateral and multilateral assistance had failed to induce any
improvement.
4. The credit was to an Argentinian government agency.
5. Argentina viewed this credit as an act of political support.
6. The law at that time mandated taking human rights into consideration in
approving Eximbank credits.
Bowie Speech, supra note 99.
In response to this denial Congress received a letter from the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce in Argentina expressing the unanimous disapproval of its thousand-plus mem-
bership. The letter urged reversal of the action before irreparable damage was done to
several billion dollars of U.S. business and business investments in Argentina. Ex-Im Bank
Veto of Credit for Argentine Sale Blackens U.S. -L.A. Relations, BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA
233, 4 (Jul. 27, 1978).
"' [1978] 216 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) A-8.
12 Bowie Speech, supra note 99.
Supra note 49.
l' Note, however, that there is presently an Eximbank policy of limiting transactions
with Chile to $750,000.
"' Supra note 86.
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The Jackson-Vanik Amendment represents a second important
restriction on Eximbank activity."2 It is essentially a fixed ban
against credits and most favored nation (MFN) status to non-
market countries which deny their citizens the rights to emigrate.
However, it does permit the President to waive the restriction.
President Ford waived it for Romania in 1975,11 and President
Carter waived it for Hungary in 1978.110 Poland and Yugoslavia
are also eligible for most favored nation treatment and Eximbank
transactions under an exception relating to Tariff Schedules. 1 '
3. International Financial Institutions (IFIs)
IFIs, also known as Multilateral Development Banks, are
lending institutions which grant credits and loans to developing
nations for a variety of development projects. Some of these
credits and loans create U.S. export opportunities. As a member
of these institutions, the United States may abstain or vote to op-
pose loans made to human rights-denying nations. IG is responsi-
ble for deciding which way the U.S. representatives to these in-
stitutions should cast their votes on particular loans.
The United States has limited power in the IFIs and has not
caused project loans to be denied on human rights grounds,
although it has abstained from voting and has voted against many
loans." However, the lack of a veto does not mean that the United
States is without influence in the IFIs. For example, after the
United States informed some nations that it intended to oppose
their loans in upcoming votes, the nations requested delays in con-
sideration of the loans for an indefinite period of time."
The primary aims of the United States in the IFIs are to satisfy
basic human needs and to channel funds away from human rights
violating nations when the project will not directly benefit the
needy. 8' When deciding whether to attempt to channel funds
away from an applicant with a poor human rights record, IG will
' Supra note 53.
l Exec. Order No. 11,854. 40 Fed. Reg. 18391 (1975).
18 Exec. Order No. 12,051, 43 Fed. Reg. 15131 (1978).
181 19 U.S.C. 2432(e) (1979 Supp.).
According to the Secretary of the Treasury, testifying before Congress in late 1978,
the U.S. had opposed eighteen loans to nine countries in the IFIs, although all passed.
Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations, Fiscal year 1979, Senate Hear-
ings Before the Comm. on Appropriations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 146 (1978) (statement of
Secretary Blumenthal).
1s, Report Submitted to Congress in Response to Title VII, Public Law 95-118, 95th
Cong. 2d Sess., 2 (1978).
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consider: (1) the nature of the human rights situation in the appli-
cant nation (and trends), (2) prior U.S. human rights initiatives to
that country, (3) the effectiveness of an available strategy, (4)
other U.S. interests, and (5) the integrity of the IFI as an effective
vehicle for international development. 1' In addition to these con-
siderations, IG may take into account a violating nation's failure
to respond to U.S. appeals and as a result direct votes against that
nation's projects even if they address basic human needs.", The
purpose of this action is to disassociate the United States from the
repressive regime."7
4. The Witteveen Facility
The Witteveen Facility provides an additional source of funds
for the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF is an inter-
national monetary institution that helps qualified members
stabilize their economies during times of imbalance. This keeps
member nations from resorting to restrictive trade policies and
other protectionist measures that would be disruptive of interna-
tional economic relations. Financial participation in the
Whitteveen Facility is shared equally by OPEC countries and
developed countries. Unlike the IFIs, which furnish long-term
development loans, the IMF and the Witteveen Facility provide
medium-term financial assistance for monetary and currency
stabilization purposes. Eighty percent of the assistance is at close
to market rates of interest. Futhermore, members of IMF who
meet certain criteria may draw on IMF credits as of right,
whereas no such rights exists for applicants to the IFIs."'
The language of the Bretton Woods Amedment" compels the
Secretary of the Treasury to instruct the United States executive
director on the Executive Board of the IMF to initiate a wide con-
sultation with other nation's directors to formulate stabilization
programs which are designed to meet basic human needs. How
this amendment has or will change the policies of the IMF remains
to be seen. The sharply-criticized secrecy of the IMF loan review-
ID Id at 4.
18 For instance, the U.S. opposed a loan to Chile in May 1978 in the InterAmerican
Development Bank when the project was for Rural Public Health. Id at 7.
In Id. at 5.
Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1979, Senate
Hearings Before the Comm. on Appropriations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 164-5 (1978) (statement
of Treasury Sec. Blumenthal).
'" Supra note 63.
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ing process'" makes evaluation of the effect of this amendment,
from an export or from a human rights standpoint, impossible.
5. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
OPIC facilitates investment abroad by United States citizens by
offering investment insurance,"' investment guarantees, " ' direct
investment help" 8 and other miscellaneous services. Like the
IFIs the purpose of OPIC is to foster economic and social develop-
ment in the recipient country and act as an arm of U.S. foreign
policy.'"
In creating and expanding new business projects, OPIC funding
helps expand U.S. export opportunities. 148 This of course is not
OPIC's primary purpose. 7 Under the application of the "new
directions" language, OPIC is required to give preference to pro-
jects in less developed nations having per capita incomes of $520
or less, as well as to restrict its activities in nations with per
capita income of $1,000 or more.4 The "new directions" language
will probably prevent OPIC from playing a vital role in any new
effort to increase U.S. exports.
Although OPIC projects are subject to human rights examina-
tion by the IG there have been only two instances of discretionary
action taken since the enactment of the human rights provision in
mid-1978. One case involved the denial of insurance for the expan-
sion of a business in EL Salvador which was partially owned by
the El Salvadorian government. The other case was a delay for in-
1" See J. MORELL AND D. GISSELQUIST, HOW THE IMF SLIPPED $464 MILLION TO SOUTH
AFRICA, 4 (1978).
1 22 U.S.C. § 2194(a) (1979 Supp.).
1 22 U.S.C. § 2194(b) (1979 Supp.).
'u 22 U.S.C. § 2194(c) (1979 Supp.).
22 U.S.C. §§ 2194(d)-(f) (1979 Supp.).
14 22 U.S.C. § 2191(1) (1979 Supp.).
14 Total U.S. exports to OPIC-assisted projects (separated from other balance-of-
payments factors) were (in millions of U.S. dollars): $875 in 1975, $1,385 in 1976, $3,320 in
1977, $807 in 1978. Letter from John C. Graham, International Economist, OPIC to Russell
Carter and Frank Brogan (April 5, 1978) (on file at GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.).
14 Regarding the fulfillment of its primary purposes, OPIC has come under some attack.
See, e.g., criticism that OPIC had concentrated many of its projects in countries guilty of
human rights violations and that the projects frequently helped increase the gap between
rich and poor. CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY, OPIC: INSURING THE STATUS QUO
(September 1977).
The AFL-CIO complained, on the other hand, that OPIC was helping to export U.S. jobs.
See H.R. REP. No. 670, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 628 (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 628.
14 22 U.S.C. § 2191(2) (1979 Supp.).
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surance for a privately owned business in the same country. As a
matter of course, OPIC does not presently operate in Uruguay,
Uganda and South Africa.149
D. Licensing
Licensing of exports involves two main types of exports goods:
munitions exports and general commercial sales exports. Dif-
ferent criteria for granting licenses are employed by various agen-
cy groups in both the Department of State and Commerce. The
process of licensing of munitions will be discussed here first,
followed by a review of the commercial sales licensing procedures.
1. Munitions Exports
Munitions exports are processed through one of two programs:
the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program or the commercial
munitions sales program. Section 502(B)(a)(2) of the Foreign
Assistance Act prohibits security assistance from being furnished
to human rights violators. Security assistance is defined to cover
all aspects of munitions sales-credits, licensing and the sales
themselves. 15 Thus both FMS and commercial munitions sales
would theoretically be unavailable to a government which violates
the human rights of its citzens.
a. FMS. If the munitions sale is for "major defense
equipment" '151 and the amount of the transaction is $25,000,0001 2 or
more, the sale must undergo FMS licensing review. This is most
frequently the method by which foreign purchasers buy
American-made arms. Under this program, the Department of
Defense purchases the munitions from the manufacturer or takes
them from its own stock and sells them to the buyer on a
government-to-government basis, frequently assisting the sale
with government financing.'
'" South Africa is ineligible for OPIC projects because it has per capita income exceeding
$1000. Were the per capita income not a barrier, it is likely that human rights reasons
would still prohibit OPIC involvement.
" Supra note 26.
151 22 U.S.C. § 2794(6) (1979 Supp.). Major defense equipment is defined as any item on
the U.S. Munitions List which is significant combat equipment into which $50 million of non-
recurring research and development costs have been invested or has a production cost of
$200 million. For enumerations of significant combat equipment, see 22 C.F.R. § 121.03.
22 U.S.C. § 2778. This ceiling does not apply to NATO members, Austria, New
Zealand, Japan and nations with which the U.S. has entered into a congressionally approv-
ed co-production agreement.
5 22 U.S.C. §§ 2763, 2764 (1979 Supp.) allow for the extension of credits and guarantees
by the President. Guarantees need only have ten percent of the principal amount commit-
ted from the appropriated funds. Hence in Fiscal Year 1978, $675.85 million in appropriated
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In addition to the hurdle posed by Section 502(B)(a)(2), FMS
credits and guarantees may not be approved if they would aid dic-
tators who are denying their people fundamental rights except
when the President determines that approval would be important
to the security of the United States.15' Furthermore, FMS must be
compatible with foreign policy and foreign aid goals, with due con-
sideration given to the impact of the sale on the purchaser's social
and economic development.1"
The proposed sales under this program are examined by the
AECB and its working groups. 1" The Arms Transfer Policy Plann-
ing Group, which as a permanent member from HA, considers
human rights factors, along with many others, and recommends a
course of action to the AECB. Disagreements within the AECB
are settled by higher level officials within the executive branch.
Sales posing major policy questions might even require a
presidential decision. Historically, however, the State Department
makes most of the final decisions on individual sales.6 7
The President is required to submit a report to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate detailing transactions for the
sales of $7,000,000 or more of "major defense equipment" or
$25,000,000 of defense items or services at least 30 days prior to
the issuance of a license.1" By requiring this advance notice, Con-
gress is able to confer with the Administration over specific sales
whenever it feels more emphasis should be accorded a particular
foreign policy interest in the decision to license the sale.
b. Commercial Munitions Sales. The other program through
which military exports may pass is the commercial munitions
sales program. 159 This is for sales that are transacted directly be-
funds supported $2,102.35 million of FMS credit sales. ARMS TRANSFER, supra note 91, at 51.
22 U.S.C. § 2751 (1979 Supp.).
IN Id. Additionally, Eximbank may not finance munition sales to less developed coun-
tries. 22 U.S.C. § 2722 (1979 Supp.). However it seems that Eximbank has not financed any
military sales even to developed nations in the recent past. ARMS TRANSFER, supra note 91,
at 51. Neither may sales under FMS be made to less developed countries if such sales
divert U.S. aid funds or the less developed country's own resources to munitions purchases
as to materially interfere with economic development. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2775 (1979 Supp.).
Also, the Assistant Secretary of State for HA must furnish upon congressional request a
report on the exclusionary policies based on the race, religion, national origin or sex of the
purchasing government when such policies exclude a U.S. person from participating in the
sales or transaction. 22 U.S.C.A. 2755(d) (1) (1979 Supp.).
"' ARMS TRANSFER, supra note 91, at 75.
157 Id.
' 22 U.S.C. § 2776(c) (1979 Supp.).
Although not labeled commercial munitions sales in 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1979 Supp.),
which authorizes these sales, "defense articles" and "defense services" are defined in 22
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tween the foreign purchaser and the U.S. seller. Although com-
mercial sales are not controlled by some of the particular human
rights language that relates to the FMS, the commandment of
Section 502(B)(a)(2) still applies.
PM/MC oversees licensing for commercial munitions sales. The
reviews procedure seems to be as broadly based as that of the
AECB but not as compartmentalized." PM/MC judges the sales
on a number of criteria, and calls upon HA to deliver its views on
the advisability of the sales from the human rights perspective.
As with all decisional groups, disagreements between PM/MC and
the conferring groups escalate within each participating depart-
ment's hierarchy.
PM/MC compiles the U.S. Munitions List, otherwise known as
the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)61 which
designate which goods are considered munitions requiring licens-
ing, whether exported through either the FMS program or the
commerical munitions sales program. This list contains not only
items of fundamentally military character but also items that have
both military and civilian uses. A prominent example of these dual
use items is the air-ambulance, a helicopter designed for transport
of wounded or injured persons. Despite its capacity for non-
military use, this article is considered "equipped"'1 for military
use, and falls under the jurisdiction of the ITAR. It is capability,
not end-use, that determines an items presence in the ITAR,
although end-use may be considered in the licensing review pro-
cedure. PM/MC heads the "Grey Area Committee" in the Depart-
ment of State which considers matters relating to commercial
goods with dual uses. 3 It also renders opinions to manufacturers
on whether a given export will fall under the jurisdiction of the
ITAR.
Both commercial munitions sales and FMS are subject to ap-
proval at the time export licenses are applied for, but sales pro-
U.S.C. § 2794(7) as commercial [munitions] exports on the U.S. Munitions List (International
Traffic in Arms Regulations, or ITAR). These are basically munitions which are not expen-
sive and sophisticated enough to qualify as "major defense items," but which still possess
inherently military characteristics.
IU See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, THE OFFICE OF MUNITIONS CONTROL - ITS PRINCIPAL FUNC-
TIONS (1972). Unlike the AECB, this consultation seems to be informal, without structured
working groups with specific areas of concern.
.. 22 C.F.R. § 121 et seq.
'" Category VIII - Aircraft, Spacecraft and Associated Equipment in 22 C.F.R. § 121.01
includes aircraft, including helicopters, which are designed, modified or equipped for
military purposes.
I" DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 160, at 3.
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posals submitted by manufacturers to prospective purchasers are
similarly subject to approval by PM/MC, as required by the
ITAR. ' The Secretary of State may revoke a license at any time
prior to shipment. "
2. Commercial Licensing
Goods exported under the authority of the Export Administra-
tion Act sometimes require validated licenses which are issued by
the Commerce Department in conjunction with other depart-
ments. The Commodity Control List (CCL),1M compiled by the
Commerce Department, designates those goods which require
validated licenses. Aside from high technology goods which
typically require validated licenses to allow review for national
security reasons, items on the crime control and detection list""7
and the aviation and avionics list'" (such as non-military aircraft
and parts including inertial guidance systems) require human
rights review.
The Commerce Department's Export Administration Office
(EAO) receives license applications and, after processing them,
contacts pertinent departments for their approval."9 If sent to the
State Department, a license application is directed to the Bureau
of Economic and Business Affairs. If necessary, this bureau will
route the application to the regional and functional bureaus con-
cerned with issues raised by the applications such as human
rights, anti-terrorism, or nuclear proliferation. If human rights is
an issue, the application is sent to HA, which confers with the
regional bureau representing the destination country. Should they
agree upon denial or approval, the decision is made at that level.
If disagreement persists beyond fifteen days, an officer at HA
prepares an "action memo" for the Deputy Secretary of State,
who then decides upon the State Department's position. In the
16, 22 C.F.R. § 123.16.
16 22 C.R.F. § 123.05 states that licenses may be denied, revoked, suspended or amended
for national security or foreign policy reasons.
"' 15 C.F.R. §§ 399 et seq.
"n 15 C.F.R. § 376.14. Examination of these items is mandated by 50 U.S.C. app. §
2403(nX1) (1979 Supp.).
16 15 C.F.R. 399.1 CCL-13-16.
Although the Commerce Department technically has no discretionary human rights
review jurisdiction, it would obviously have the power to deny applications for unlawful ex-
ports, such as crime control equipment to the South African or Namibian military forces.
Apparently it has exercised some discretionary power on its own accord. One government
official told of the denial of a export license for a computer which was bound for a Latin
American country, because the $5 million computer was to be used for storing finger prints.
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event that there is continuing disagreement between departments
on the application, the difference might theoretically escalate as
high as the President.17
Highly publicized instances of trade blockages with the
U.S.S.R., which were at least partly for human rights reasons,171
were brought about by the Carter Administration through com-
mercial license denials, delays and new regulations.172 It seems
unlikely at this point that the commercial licensing mechanism
will be used again to advance United States human rights in-
terests, although other foreign policy interests, such as national
security, do result in denials and considerable delay in export
licensing. ' 73 Human rights considerations, however, are not chief
among the reasons for licensing denials other than policy equip-
ment and munitions.
70 In practice it is doubtful that many commercial licensing decisions rise even to the
Assisstant Secretary level in the Administration. In 1977 only five referrals were decided
at the Deputy Assistant level; one went higher. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO CON-
GRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: ADMINISTRATION OF U.S. EXPORT LICENSING SHOULD BE CON-
SOLIDATED TO BE MORE RESPONSIVE TO INDUSTRY 5 (1978).
"I N.Y. Times, July 13, 1978, Al at col. 6. President Carter denied that he was planning
any retaliation for the convictions, id at col. 4, but this statement hardly seems credible in
view of the timing of the blockage which ensued.
" During July of 1978 relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had become tense due
to a large extent to the arrest and trial of a number of Soviet dissidents, notably Anatoly
Shcharansky. Id. at col. 6. In an attempt to penalize the U.S.S.R. for the actions taken
against the dissidents, the White House reviewed all the major technical and scientific ex-
changes between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in order to ferret out and end those most
beneficial to the Soviets. Id. The National Security Council had been contacting congres-
sional figures to gain support for the cancellation, by export license denial, of a Sperry-
Univac computer sale to the Soviet news agency TASS. Id. at A4, col. 4. Despite opposition
from the Departments of State, Treasury and Commerce that the blockage would not im-
prove human rights accorded to Soviet dissidents, but would injure U.S. economic interests,
id. the license was denied. The President asserted that the computer would have greatly
added to TASS's computer capability. [1978] 216 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) AA-1. This claim
was denied by Sperry's chairman who noted that similar computers had perviously been
okayed for sales to the Russians. [1978] 217 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) A-9.
This incident followed in the wake of another highly publicized use of commercial ex-
port licensing for U.S. foreign policy purposes involving the Oshkosh Truck Company. This
company signed a contract for 400 heavy duty trucks with Libya, apparently against the ad-
vice of a State Department official, [19781 207 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) A-1, but the advice of
a Commerce Department official who stated that the Commerce Department's opinion con-
cerning issuance of a license is usually determinative. Id. The State Department urged
strongly that the license be denied because of Libya's alleged harboring of terrorists and
because of allegations that the trucks would be used to transport Soviet-made tanks. After
receiving assurances that Libya had signed an anti-terrorism pact, and that the trucks
would not be used for military purposes the license for modified versions of the original
trucks was approved. [19781 235 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) A-1.
'= For a lengthier discussion of the commercial licensing process, see Note, Export
Licensing: Uncoordinated Trade Repression, 9 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 345 (1979).
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IV. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Agency Discretion Versus Mandatory Actions
Most of the human rights statutes vest discretionary powers in
various executive agencies.17" ' A statute typically contemplates the
imposition of human rights sanctions under specific cir-
cumstances, for example when the nation receiving aid engages in
a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights, or when
United States interests in the area of human rights will be clearly
and importantly advanced. In contrast to discretionary enforce-
ment provisions are those which call for a direct ban or limitation on
licensing or financing of certain exports to particular countries.
Some examples are: Eximbank transactions for South Africa; 1 5 ap-
propriations to' Vietnam, Cambodia, Uganda, Cuba;17 exports to
Uganda; 77 and military sales to Argentina."" Generally, the sanc-
tions are to be enforced until an oppressive policy, such as apar-
theid in South Africa, or repressive practices, such as torture or
political detention, are ameliorated.
There are both advantages and disadvantages to each statutory
approach. Rigid bans provide for a predictability. Exporters
presumably will make use of this predictability by funneling their
market-developing resources, such as executive time spent
developing sales contacts, setting up sales offices, arranging for
local financing, and orchestrating co-production and licensing
agreements, away from the designated countries. There are two
problems with this approach however. First, where the imposition
of the ban or restriction is an attempt to coerce respect for human
rights in the target nation by restricting needed goods, the impor-
ting nation may pursue non-American suppliers. In addition, United
States exporters will seek ways to circumvent the ban when possi-
ble, thereby diminishing its coercive effect. 79 Second, a ban re-
stricts United States diplomatic flexibility by eliminating the
possibility of providing incentives for a nation to improve its human
... See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(1)(B) (1976) (Eximbank); 22 U.S.C. §§ 262c, g (1979 Supp.)
(OPIC).
175 Supra note 86.
re Supra note 89.
1 Supra note 82 and 83.
"' 6Supra note 85.
17 It is not suggested that the purpose of all of these bans is coercive. For example, it is
unlikely that South Africa would be coerced into discarding its policy of apartheid merely
because all U.S. goods are withheld from it. Nevertheless, the United States imposes a total
ban to register strong disapproval of the policy.
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rights situation. Under a discretionary clause, which allows United
States human rights officials to review individual cases, specific
steps taken by a foreign government to ameliorate its human rights
conditions can be recognized and applauded. Thus, for example, if a
country frees some political prisoners or allows an international
human rights organization to investigate its practices, the United
States could show approval by facilitating Eximbank credits for ex-
ports to the country, by approving previously denied or delayed
munitions sales, or by increasing development aid to that country. If
a strict ban is imposed, incremental improvements in a country's
human rights situation might not be significant enough to overcome
legislative and bureaucratic inertia and cause a lifting of the ban. s°
There are also limits to the discretionary use of denials, delays
and limitations in Eximbank, OPIC and licensing, when the pur-
pose is to gain leverage by depriving target nations of United States
exports and credit. These methods, when used to give teeth to
diplomatic dialogue, can only produce meaningful deprivation in
the target country (and hence coercive effect) when that country
has placed heavy reliance on the availability of goods from United
States sources. If used too frequently, these policy tools become
less effective by casting great doubt on the reliability of the
United States as a supplier. Further, this doubt could spread to
other countries which view themselves as prospective targets.
The result could well be that potential target nations would simply
develop other ready sources of supply to plan against such future
contingencies.
The discretionary use of denial, delay and limitation for coer-
cion is also marred by lack of communication between HA and
other human right agencies, and the exporting community. An ex-
amination of human rights enforcement in the commercial export
sphere reveals a sense of circumspection on the part of human
rights officials, but it is difficult to determine whether this is due
merely to intradepartmental pressures or instead to careful weigh-
ing of export and credit availability elsewhere and the long-term
adverse trade impact on normal United States trade relations.
When practical, recommendations for the limitation, delay or denial
of an Eximbank transaction should be imposed only on United States
exports which command competitive superiority in foreign export
markets (unless the human rights situation in the recipient nation is
so horrendous that policy requires a more complete break in eco-
'm See note 6, supra. If there is no change of human rights improvement by means of
such incentives, bans may still be used to disaccociate the U.S. government from that na-
tion's practices.
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nomic relations). It is only these exports which can bear the added
cost of unreliability for future exports caused by the limitation,
delay or denial. In addition, the availability to a foreign government
or business of alternative financing should be examined before the
U.S. orders a delay or denial of Eximbank credit. Generally, when
it is uncertain whether Eximbank financing is available, an ex-
porter and importer must rely on private financing usually obtain-
ed through commercial banks. Human rights policy makers must
take into account that denial of Eximbank financing will have the
greatest adverse effect on United States export markets when im-
posed (1) upon human rights problem nations which are also
perceived as high credit risks for private financing and (2) upon
"big ticket items" such as costly Allis-Chalmers turbines, for
which commercial banks might be unwilling to extend the long-
term financing that would make the United States export competi-
tive.
Discretionary clauses present additional problems for export
trade. The Chaffee Amendment to the Export-Import Bank Act of
1945 is a good example. An exporter many expend a substantial
amount of time and money developing a market or setting up a
particular transaction. Although the provision permits the Presi-
dent to deny an application for Eximbank's services only where it
would clearly and importantly advance United States interests in
the areas of human rights, the exporter might lose the sale and have
his market jeopardized if, with little advance notice, his transaction
were singled out as one that could be used to clearly and impor-
tantly advance human rights concerns. One can only speculate
about this presently since there has been no discretionary en-
forcement of the Chaffee Amendment. The jeopardy that the ex-
porter's market may be subjected to could range from nonexistent
to grave. Perhaps a separate government insurance program
should be created to indemnify such an exporter for the fixed in-
vestment losses he experiences due to human rights action. Such
a program would reduce or eliminate loss to the exporter without
compromising human rights policy, by imposing the cost of human
rights policy onto the government, and ultimately the taxpayers,
who in theory are the ones who wish to see human rights policy
advanced.
As explained in section III A. 4 of this Note, officials at HA
have publicly outlined a series of actions which they may recom-
mend against an offending country. However, several questions
critical to export planning remain unanswered. How flagrant must
a particular nation's human rights violations be before HA will
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recommend a particular step? When will a decisional group's con-
cern for this situation offset a conflicting foreign policy interest
causing the group to accept HA's recommendation? How will a
decisional group's decisions affect the market for any given ex-
port?
Uncertainty as to government policy increased by the reluc-
tance of the State Department to issue a public blacklist of nations
against which sanctions are consistently applied. Such a list, HA
contends, would lead to diplomatic resentment and intractibility. 181
Once a country is publicly branded by HA as a human rights trans-
gressor, the reasoning goes, it would have little incentive to im-
prove its human rights practices. What little leverage the State
Department could exert would be jeopardized if not completely
lost. It should be mentioned that HA is willing to advise exporters
with regard to possible human rights sanctions, but exporters do
not make frequent use of this service.
Denial of IFI funds to nations because of human rights viola-
tions has an indirect impact on United States exports, since some
of the loan proceeds will often be used to purchase United States
goods. Congress thoroughly debated the different effect of agency
discretion and strict bans in amending the IFI appropriation bill.18
Since the purposes of United States involvement in the IFIs do
not include expanding United States exports, the facilitation of
United States export planning should be a minor consideration. In
the IFIs, flexibility rather than predictability is the critical factor.
The Jackson-Vanik Amendment has been critcized as a strict
ban which is narrow both in terms of its intended targets (na-
tions politically at odds with the United States) and in terms of
its human rights base (i.e., it is directed only towards the single
right of emigration)., ' Recent critcs have stressed the negative
impact of this strict ban on trade,18' especially East-West trade.
Senator Stevenson (D., Illinois) has proposed an amendment
"' Supra note 99.
See note 62, aupra.
' See Weissbrodt, supra note 1, at 275-77. The author suggests that socialist nations
might well conclude that this legislation is not part of a concern for human rights, but con-
stitutes a new phase of the Cold War propaganda competition. To allow this perception to
go uncorrected would be a mistake. Weissbrodt concludes that "if the United States human
rights efforts are to be credible and effective, they must be perceived by every nation as
motivated by a genuine desire to improve the observance of human rights and not
motivated by political dominance of the Third World or by Cold War competition with the
Soviet Union." Id at 277.
' C. Gershman, Selling Them the Rope-Business and the Soviets, COMMENTARY, April
1, 1979, at 35.
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which will give the President more discretion in determining
whether to waive the sanctions tied to emigration policy in non-
market nations. The new amendment would allow the President
to grant a waiver for a five year period instead of the present
one year. Also, the waiver might be based on a Presidential
determination that emigration policies were improving in a coun-
try. The President would no longer have to receive assurances
from the nation. This discretion would improve the application of
this policy because, as Senator Stevenson argues, "countries may
do quietly that which they were reluctant to announce formally
in response to threats or demands. And trade could proceed
satisfactorily as it cannot on a spasmodic, interruptible basis." '
Given the assurance of a five year waiver, exporters could pur-
sue new markets and seek long-term credit arrangements.
In the final analysis, a policy based predominantly on discre-
tionary power is desirable. It is more manageable in bringing
about improvements in human rights observance, and a flexible
approach is more aptly suited to the nature of the evil addressed
by human rights legislation. To an extent, some loss of United
States export volume is an inevitable consequence of the exercise of
discretionary power over exports. But as human rights policy,
procedures and agencies mature, uncertainty in enforcement
should diminish. Since export losses are inversely proportional to
predictability in enforcement, temptations to interrupt standard
human rights implementation procedures (such as the National
Security Council intrusion into the licensing process in the
Sperry Univac computer case)' " should be resisted by the Ex-
ecutive Branch. Strict bans ought to be used only in those in-
stances where the United States intends to disassociate itself
from a historically repressive and recalcitrant regime.
B. Licensing'"7
Congress should pass legislation to improve the munitions licen-
[19791 243 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) M-1. In the statement and analysis accompanying
his proposed amendment, Stevenson pointed out further that the legislation does not go so
far as to grant MFN status and credits without qualification or condition but rather
replaces an explicit linkage to emigration polic with a procedural formulation which implies
that the continued availability of credits and MFN status will be subject to periodic review.
The proposed legislation would also revise the 1974 Stevenson Amendment by placing a $2
billion limit on outstanding Eximbank credits for exports to any Communist State. The
previous law set a $300 million limit on credit for the Soveit Union only.
'See note 172, supra.
See Note, Export Licensing: Uncoordinated Trade Repression, 9 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 345 (1979), for a lengthier discussion and criticism of Licensing in the context of the EAA.
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sing process. Under current law, some "dual use" items (i.e., hav-
ing both commercial and military use) may not be exported to
countries on which munitions sales bans have been imposed even
though no commerical export bans have been imposed. Such a
situation should not occur without a showing that diversion of the
dual use item to military use has been made.
Unavoidably, sales of weapon and other military goods and ser-
vices will remain sensitive to human rights and other foreign
policy interests. It is not surprising that expanded munitions
export sales is not a key element of the Carter Administration's
National Export Policy.
C. Overlapping and Complex Statutes
Human rights legislation represents a broadly supported man-
date to infuse human rights considerations into United States
foreign policy decisions. This mandate is assuming the texture of
bedrock."' But efficient governance is not inconsistent with this
human rights concern, and there are aspects of what some ex-
porters regard as an overly confusing network of legislation that
cry out for correction and improvement.
Congress could act to simplify the legislation in two ways. First,
as HA assumes the responsibilities assigned to it under recent
human rights statutes,N Congress should refrain from passing
short and long term credit and appropriations bans directed against
specific countries. Second, now that United States human rights
concerns have been publicized world-wide and a permanent
bureau has been established in the State Department, Section 112
prohibitions which relate to the Food-for-Peace program should be
re-evaluated and perhaps eliminated.
In recent years, Congress has passed many human rights
statutes which relate to specific countries. As previously mention-
ed a number of these take the form of a ban which will not be
lifted until the human rights situation in a given country im-
proves. Often however an appropriations bill, which funds other
major assistance programs for a period of a year or less will pro-
vide that funds appropriated or credit authorized by it shall not
be granted to a particular country for human rights reasons.'"
Under the authority of the provisions outlined in Part II of this
Note, the State Department, in conjuction with HA, has been
18 See note 1, supra
'U Supra note 28.
', Supra note 21.
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given the authority to review the condition of human rights in
foreign countries and when necessary impose bans on credits,
guarantees and appropriations. Congress should respect the ex-
pertise and authority of this agency and defer to its judgment.
Companies which want to export goods to a foreign country
should be able to turn to HA for advice on the status of our policy
toward that foreign country without fear of the possibility of a
further congressional ban, except in the most extra-ordinary cir-
cumstances.
The application of the section 112 human rights sanction to the
P.L. 480 Food-for-Peace program should be reviewed and perhaps
eliminated. Under section 112, P.L. 480 financing of sales of
agricultural commodities is prohibited to a country which engages
in consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights unless
such sales will directly benefit the needy in that country.'9 1 The
general food program, however, has as a principal goal the allevia-
tion of hunger and malnutrition in the recipient countries."" It can
be argued that while general economic and security assistance
programs symbolize political support for a recipient country, the
Food-for-Peace program represents a purely humanitarian effort
to directly aid the poor and needy. By creating and funding
this program, the United States government has raised its level
of concern for the poor to new heights. It is inconsistent with
the goal of Food-for-Peace to deny benefits to a nation if the
needy there actually benefit, simply because the government fails
to respect the human rights of its citizens. In fact, to terminate ef-
fective Food-for-Peace aid for the sole reason that the foreign
government is a human rights violator is to add insult to injury.
On the other hand, if the program does not effectively aid the
poor, it should be revised or abandoned in that country.
D. Government Evaluation and Report
A broad-based and thorough enforcement of human rights
discretionary sanction would have an enormous adverse impact on
exports. On the other hand, if human rights policy is to be taken
seriously, discretionary delays and denials of credits and ap-
propriations must be imposed at times, with a resulting negative
impact on United States foreign trade. In trying to balance a
strong export policy against a sound human rights policy, the
gover'nment is faced with the major task of determining the im-
, Supra note 34.
i H.R. REP. No. 95-1087, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1978).
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pact of human rights actions on the level of exports, both by coun-
try and by product. It is recommended that the General Accoun-
ting Office or an Executive Branch Task Force undertake a study
in this area. Such a study should contain foreign market share
analysis establishing (1) the percentage of United States trade
represented by each type of export product in each country receiv-
ing United States goods; (2) the availability of similar exports
elsewhere; (3) the fixed investment involved in marketing a given
export in a given market; and (4) the effect of trade losses and
gains on employment in the United States. A record of the history
of human rights observance in each nation should also be included.
Additionally, an attempt should be made to separate extraneous
factors not directly related to the effects of human rights policy
on trade from those which are related (e.g., inflation, fiscal and
monetary policies, polticial changes which effect a nation's import
policies, etc.). Instances of circumvention by United States ex-
porters of human rights sanctions, primarily by non-governmental
financing and movement of manufacturing bases outside the United
States should be traced and analyzed.
With this information in hand, policy makers will be able to estab-
lish accurately the human rights policy impact on trade and can in-
telligently weigh the probable business effect of the action against
human rights and other United States foreign policy concerns. Also,
in developing a strategy to increase exports, the government
could seek to promote the kinds of businesses and products which
are least likely to be affected by enforcement of the human rights
statutes. Certainly some of his information may already be
available to HA and IG. However, the information does not seem
to be organized or accessible in terms of export interests. To
make a lasting contribution to efficient government, the report
should stress the need to intelligently balance, where they con-
flict, export policy and human rights policy.
Russell D. Carter
Frank D. Brogan
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